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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by William M. Droze*
and
Suzanne F. Sturdivant*"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2000 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was called upon to decide high profile and difficult issues. It helped
determine the fate of young Elian Gonzalez' and the course of President
Bush and former Vice President Al Gore's legal battles for the presidency.2 Yet some of these decisions-and many others-turned on less
sensational procedural questions. This Article examines the role that
procedural issues have played in the court's recent opinions. It is
intended to help practitioners gauge trends in the court's approach to
interlocutory matters; timeliness of notice of appeal and presentation of
argument; the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness; and
standards of review on appeal.
II.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE ELECTION CASES

In the late fall of 2000, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced
some complex procedural issues when it heard appeals from several of
the cases that arose from disputed presidential election results in
Florida. In Siegel v. Lepore,' the court considered under what circum-

* Partner in the law firm of Troutman Sanders L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. University
of North Carolina (A.B., 1984); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1987).
** Associate in the law firm of Troutman Sanders L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Agnes
Scott College (B.A. 1991); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., 2000).
1. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000), affd en banc, 215 F.3d 1243
(11th Cir. 2000).
2. See Harris v. Florida Elections Comm'n, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000); Touchston
v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2000); Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir.
2000).
3. 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000).
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stances it could not review a final judgment of a state court and when
it should abstain from cases involving state law issues. Then presidential candidate George W. Bush, vice presidential candidate Dick Cheney,
and several Florida voters asked the court to enjoin local authorities in
four Florida counties from manually recounting presidential ballots cast
on November 7, 2000. Among other things, plaintiffs claimed that the
manual recounts violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The district court
had refused to halt the recounts, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.'
The court began by considering whether it had subject matter
jurisdiction, noting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented all
federal courts except the United States Supreme Court from reviewing
"the final judgments of state courts."' The court stated this doctrine
also applied to claims that are "inextricably intertwined with a state
court judgment."7 Although plaintiffs sought review of the federal
district court's refusal to grant an injunction, their constitutional claims
were apparently "inextricably intertwined" with the Florida Supreme
Court's decision requiring Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris
to accept late results of manual recounts.8 Ordinarily, this could have
weakened the court's ability to assert subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' constitutional claims. However, because the United States
Supreme Court had vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision by the
time the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Siegel, the court
found it "unclear ... that any final judgments giving rise to RookerFeldman concerns ... exist[ed]." 9

The court then addressed whether the mootness doctrine defeated its
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.1"
Defendants,
members of several Florida counties' canvassing boards, argued that
plaintiffs' claims were moot because the counties already had completed
the manual recounts and certified the results with the state Elections
Canvassing Commission." At the time, however, then Vice President

4. Id. at 1168-69.
5. Id. at 1168; see also Touchston, 234 F.3d 1133, 1134 (rejecting plaintiffs' request for
an emergency injunction to block manual recounts and to prevent county officials from
certifying results of manual recounts).
6. Id. at 1172 (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)).
7. Id.

8. Id.
9.

Id.

10. Id.
11. Id.
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Al Gore had filed suit in several Florida state courts to contest election
results.'2 Because the Florida courts had not resolved those suits at
the time the court of appeals reviewed this case, the "ever-shifting
circumstances" surrounding plaintiffs' claims ensured that the court was
addressing a "live" controversy.'"
The court, therefore, found that the
4
issue was not moot. 1
Siegel also presented the court of appeals with abstention issues. 5
Defendants argued that even if the court had subject matter jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' claims, it should have abstained from hearing the case
under the Burford doctrine. 16 The Burford doctrine gives federal courts
the discretion to dismiss a case (1) if the matter "presents difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import" and (2) if resolving the case in federal court would "disrupt state
efforts to establish a coherent policy."" The court stated that this
doctrine should be applied as "'an extraordinary and narrow exception
to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly
before it.""'
The court also noted that the doctrine "protect[s] complex state
administrative processes from undue federal interference."' 9 It found,
however, that plaintiffs' appeal did not impair defendants' ability to
conduct elections and resolve related disputes because plaintiffs
challenged only "discrete practices" sanctioned by a specific statute-not
the entire election process. 2 Moreover, the court stated that the case
did not undermine Florida's ability to achieve uniform results throughout the disputed counties because defendants were actually challenging
the alleged absence of "strict and uniform standards for ... conducting
...recounts."21
The court also considered whether it should abstain under the
Pullman doctrine, which allows a federal court to defer to a state court's
resolution of state law issues.
Under this doctrine, a federal court
may abstain if (1) the case presents an "unsettled question of state law"

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Circuit
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
Id. The Supreme Court originally articulated the doctrine to which the Eleventh
referred in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943). 234 F.3d at 1173.
234 F.3d at 1173.
Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
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and (2) the state law question is dispositive or would "materially alter"
any constitutional questions presented.2" The court noted that the
doctrine helped avoid conflict between federal and state functions, kept
the federal government from interfering with important state functions,
24
and prevented premature decisions on constitutional questions.
Although the court stated that the Pullman doctrine represented
defendants' "most persuasive justification" for abstention, it nevertheless
found that abstention was "particularly inappropriate" in a case that
alleged a constitutional violation of plaintiffs' voting rights.2" Thus the
court refused to abstain and considered the appeal.26

III.

APPELLATE TREATMENT OF INTERLOCUTORY MATTERS

Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review cases after
district courts issue final decisions. In some cases they may also have
jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals, which are those filed before
the lower court renders final judgment. This jurisdiction originates from
several sources. First, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) gives federal courts of
appeals jurisdiction to hear appeals from "[ilnterlocutory orders of the
district courts of the United States ... granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court." 21 In 2000, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did
not hear an interlocutory appeal based on jurisdiction under this
statute.29
The court did review an appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3),
which gives federal courts of appeals jurisdiction over challenges to
"[ilnterlocutory decrees of such district court or the judges thereof
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases
in which appeals from final decrees are allowed."3 0 In Beluga Holding,

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court also reviewed an appeal challenging the provision of the Florida
Administrative Code that set deadlines for absentee ballots. See Harris,235 F.3d at 579.
Although at first blush the case appeared to involve a pure question of state law, the court
found that it had jurisdiction because the state rule was actually derived from a federal
court order. Id.
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
28. Id. § 1292(a)(1).
29. But see In re Atlas, 210 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that court had no
jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a bankruptcy order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) because the
bankruptcy order did not qualify as an appealable injunction).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).
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Ltd. v. Commerce Capital Corp.,31 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that other courts have interpreted this provision
narrowly, and it ultimately found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
district court's decision.32 The court noted that the case began as a suit
in admiralty because it involved an action to foreclose on a ship's
mortgage.3" Appellant, however, asked the court to review the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment on a related claim for
conversion of stock certificates. 4 Thus, even though one of appellant's
claims was "cognizable in admiralty," the court found that it did not
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) because the order that
appellant appealed actually resolved a related nonadmiralty claim.35
Under certain circumstances, a federal court of appeals may review an
order even if it does not fall within the classes defined in Section
1292(a). '6 Section 1292(b) gives a court of appeals discretion to review
an order that otherwise would not be appealable when a district judge
determines that it "involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." 7 When the district court certifies the
matter for appeal, the appellant must appeal within ten days.38 The
appeal does not stay the district court proceedings unless the district
court or court of appeals so orders.39 With little explanation, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that it had jurisdiction over
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) at least twice in 2000.40
Under the collateral order doctrine, a federal appeals court may review
a district court's order even if(1) the order is not final, (2) it does not fall
within the class of orders listed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), or (3) it has
not been certified for appeal by a district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).41 The Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in Cohen v.

31. 212 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2000).
32. Id. at 1200, 1202-04.
33. Id. at 1202-03.
34. Id. at 1200.
35. Id. at 1203-04.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Ayres v. General Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 516 (11th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Mills, 221 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2000). But see Oladeinde v. Birmingham,
230 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000).
41. See Cohen v. Beneficial Life Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
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Beneficial Life IndustrialLoan Corp. ,42 and the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals applied it several times in 2000."' Under Cohen a court of
appeals may review orders that "(1) finally determine claims entirely
collateral to and separable from the substance of other claims in the
action, (2) require review because they present significant, unsettled
questions, and (3) cannot be reviewed effectively once the case is finally
decided."" In Crawford & Co. v. Apfel,4" an employer and its insurance carrier repeatedly sought to intervene in an employee's social
security disability case. The district court ultimately found that the
corporations were proper parties.46 On appeal the court of appeals
found that the issue of whether "third-party corporations" could
participate in the employee's disability hearings was a collateral issue
because it had nothing to do with the merits of the employee's disability
claim. 47 In addition, the court found that the issue presented "significant, unsettled questions" because the district court's "broad mandate"
would "create a fundamental change in the social security disability
hearing. " 4' Finally, the court found that the issue would be "otherwise
unreviewable" unless it assumed jurisdiction under the collateral issue
doctrine. 49 Because the court found that all three of the Cohen prongs
were satisfied, it had jurisdiction to review the district court's decision
under the collateral order doctrine. 0
IV. TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND PRESENTATION OF
ARGUMENT

If a party wishes to appeal a decision, Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires it to file a timely notice of appeal
with the district court's clerk within thirty days after the judgment or
order is entered. 5 If the appealing party fails to do so, the appellate

42.

Id.

43. See Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2000); Singleton v.
Apfel, 231 F.3d 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2000); Venus Lines Agency v. CVG Industria
Venezolana de Aluminio, 210 F.3d 1309, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2000).
44. Crawford, 235 F.3d at 1303 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
45. 235 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000).
46. Id. at 1300-01.
47. Id. at 1303.
48. Id.
49.

Id.

50. See id.
51. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
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court may not have sufficient jurisdiction to hear the case.52 The
Eleventh Circuit has stated that this rule should be "strictly applied."53
On several occasions, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
construed the timely notice of appeal requirements broadly. In Cannabis
Action Network, Inc. v. City of Gainesville,4 for example, the court
upheld the district court's decision to grant the appellant an extension
of time to appeal. 5 It noted that courts apply two different standards
to an appellant's motion for extension of time, depending upon when it
is filed. 6 If an appellant files a motion for extension of time before the
thirty-day period has run, a court evaluates it under a "good cause"
standard."
On the other hand, if an appellant files a motion for
extension of time after the thirty-day period has run, a court evaluates
it under an "excusable neglect" standard." Because the appellant in
Cannabis had filed its motion for extension of time after the thirty-day
period had passed, the court applied the excusable neglect standard.5 9
The court stated that under this standard, it should take into account
"'all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission, . . . the
danger of prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length of the delay and its
potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, . . .
and whether the movant acted in good faith.'"" Among other things,
the court found the effect that an extension would have on the judicial
process would be "de minimus," especially because the litigation had
continued for "many years.""1 In addition, the court found that
appellant had a legitimate reason for the delay: It had attempted to file
its notice of appeal within the thirty-day period, but the other party filed
a motion to amend, which rendered appellant's original notice "premature, and therefore, ineffective."6 2 Because the "post-judgment history
of [the] case [had] been confusing," the court deemed appellant's

52. See United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000).
53. Id. at 1200; see also In re Williams, 216 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000)
(dismissing appeal because appellants did not file notice of appeal within the ten-day
period required by Rule 8002(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure).

54.

231 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 768.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 767 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380

(1993)).
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 767-68.
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tardiness excusable and affirmed the district court's decision to allow for
an extension.63
The court also addressed what effect an honest mistake may have on
a party's failure to file a timely notice of appeal. In In re Old Naples
Securities, Inc., 4 appellants mistakenly filed their appeal in bankruptcy court, rather than district court. As a result, the notice of appeal did
not reach the district clerk until one day after the thirty-day limitation
expired.65 The court, however, found appellants' conduct excusable
because they initially filed their appeal within the thirty-day period, the
district court received the notice of appeal only one day late, and the
misfiling was the result of a clerical error.66
The court also read the thirty-day requirement expansively in an effort
to prevent a waste of judicial resources. In Reynolds v. Golden Corral
Corp.,6 7 the court noted that the thirty-day time limit starts running
from the date that the district court enters its final judgment in a
separate document, as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 58
and 79(a). 6 However, in this case, the district court issued its opinion
and order, but it never entered a final judgment. The appellant filed her
notice of appeal more than thirty days after the court issued its
opinion.6 9 On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to require the appellant to "undergo the formality of obtaining
a separate judgment ... and ...
[filing] a new notice of appeal."7 °
Instead, it found that it had jurisdiction over the case even though the
district court had failed to enter a formal judgment that would have
caused the thirty-day period to begin.71
V.

JUSTICIABILITY

Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts may
exercise their judicial power only if an actual case or controversy
exists.72 This requirement prohibits the courts from issuing advisory
opinions. Judicial interpretation of Article III has spawned three
doctrines that restrict access to federal courts: standing, ripeness, and

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
223 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1302 n.7.
Id.
213 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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mootness. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals invoked each of these
doctrines in 2000.
A.

Standing
The court of appeals has called standing "perhaps the most important
of the [Article III jurisdictional] doctrines."7 3 To establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff must present specific, concrete facts showing that74
the defendant's conduct resulted in demonstrable, particular injury.
A plaintiff must show "(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." 71 If, however,
a plaintiff fails to satisfy Article III standing requirements in its initial
complaint, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a district
court must allow the plaintiff to attempt to cure the defect in an
amended complaint." The court has also noted that federal courts
have an independent duty to address standing issues throughout a case,
even if no party raises jurisdiction issues. 7
In Wilson v. Minor78 the court found that plaintiffs had standing "to
protect their interests in being free from an illegal court-imposed
electoral system. 7 9 The district court initially determined that an
Alabama county's at-large vote for county commissioners diluted
minority voting strength; it thus tried to remedy the situation with an
injunction that divided the county into five single-member districts.8 0
Plaintiffs, white residents of the county, filed suit in district court,
claiming that the court-ordered system violated the Voting Rights Act
because it changed the number of elected commissioners from four to
five. The district court agreed and vacated the injunction."' On appeal
the court of appeals rejected the argument that plaintiffs did not have
standing to challenge the injunction. 2 The dissenting opinion suggested that plaintiffs had not shown that they suffered a "concrete and

73. Wilson v. Minor, 220 F.3d 1297, 1303 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Florida State Athletic Comm'n, 226 F.3d
1226, 1228 (11th Cir. 2000).
75. Id.
76. Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000).
77. Wilson, 220 F.3d at 1303 n.il.
78. 220 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
79. Id. at 1303 n.11.
80. Id. at 1300.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1303 n.11.
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particularized injury."" The majority, however, found that plaintiffs
had standing because they lived in the area governed by the illegal
election scheme, and the system "plainly ...

affected" their "voting

powers." 4
Standing also arose in a commercial dispute before the court of
appeals. In Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc.," plaintiffs
sued over defendant's practice of making consumers sign arbitration
agreements before defendant extended them credit.8 6 The court held
that plaintiffs had standing to "challenge the legality" of defendant's
policy because defendant required them to sign the agreements as a
condition of credit, and plaintiffs actually complied. 7
The court also found, however, that plaintiffs did not have standing to
question the arbitration agreement's enforceability because no evidence
showed that defendant "ha[d] invoked, or threatened to invoke, the
arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to
arbitration." 8 The court held that "perhaps or maybe chance" that the
defendant would seek to enforce the agreement did not qualify as an
"actual or imminent" injury in fact. ' Thus, under Bowen, the court
may analyze separately the standing issue for each claim a plaintiff
raises. Plaintiffs who assert multiple claims may have standing to raise
some but not others.
The court also had opportunity to address standing in class action
suits. In Prado-Steiman v. Bush," the court vacated plaintiffs' class
certification because it found they may have raised claims for which no
named class representative possessed standing.9' The court stated that
the class representative must have individual standing to raise all of the
class's legal claims.9 2 A court must analyze each claim separately and
assume jurisdiction only if "at least one named plaintiff has suffered the

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1304 n.11; see also Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'n, 225 F.3d 1271, 127374 (11th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court's decision that intervenors did not have
standing to challenge court-imposed election system and finding that intervenors had
standing because the system affected their voting rights).
85. 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 1334.
87. Id.; see also Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta,
219 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge
ordinance because they sought to engage in the kind of speech that the ordinance curbed).
88. 233 F.3d at 1339.
89. Id. at 1339-40.
90. 221 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).
91. Id. at 1266, 1280.
92. Id. at 1279.
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that
injury that gives rise" to each claim." Because the court found
94
this was a fact issue, it remanded the case to the district court.
The court of appeals also instructed trial courts how to handle
standing issues that turned on factual disputes. In Bischoff v. Osceola
County,95 plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of
several traffic laws. After raising questions sua sponte about plaintiffs'
standing, however, the trial court determined that plaintiffs had no
concrete injury because they had not been threatened with arrest.9" It
based its decision on "warring affidavits," including one from a police
officer that stated that he only arrested people who broke the laws and
one from plaintiffs claiming that the police had threatened to arrest
them.97 The court found that the trial court should have held an
evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute rather than relying on
the paper record.9" When evidence about a party's standing is "squarely in contradiction," a court should make its "credibility findings" by
having the witnesses testify at an evidentiary hearing rather than by
reviewing their affidavits. 99
A plaintiff that challenges a criminal statute must show that he or she
faces a credible threat of arrest. In White's Place, Inc. v. Glover,1' °
plaintiff, an incorporated adult entertainment club, challenged a city
ordinance that prohibited citizens from opposing a police officer. Police
threatened to arrest several of plaintiff's employees for opposing police
at a demonstration in front of the business.'O The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, found that, because the threats of arrest and
criminal prosecution were "personal in consequence," the corporate
plaintiff had no standing to challenge the ordinance. °2 Further,
because the corporation "ha[d] not, and could not, be arrested for
opposing a police officer," plaintiff's injury was "too speculative to
provide a basis for standing.""'

93. Id. at 1280.
94. Id.; see also Carter v. West Publ'g Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiffs lacked standing as a class and as individuals to bring time-barred
EEOC claim).
95. 222 F.3d 874 (11th Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 876-77.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 882.
99. Id. at 881.
100. 222 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1328-29.
102. Id. at 1330.
103. Id.; see also Galindo-Del Valle v. Attorney General, 213 F.3d 594, 598 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding that plaintiff had no standing to challenge constitutionality of law that was
not applied in his case); Moore v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 216 F.3d
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The court also addressed standing in a Fourth Amendment case,
0 4 Two criminal defendants filed a motion to
United States v. Cooper."
suppress drugs seized from a hotel room but offered no evidence that
they had rented or paid for the room personally. ' Because the court
found no proof that the room was "theirs," as defendants claimed, they
The court thus held that the district
had no expectation of privacy.'
court did not err when it denied defendants' motion to suppress for lack
of standing.'o 7
The court also reiterated the requirements for establishing "next
friend standing" in Hauser v. Moore."" Plaintiffs purported to act as
the "next friends" of death row inmate Dan Patrick Hauser when they
sought and obtained a stay of execution.0 9 On appeal, however, the
court of appeals found that they had no standing to intervene."' The
court stated that a "next friend" must (1) adequately explain why the
"real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf' and (2) be "truly
dedicated to the best interests" of that party."' The court questioned
whether plaintiffs, including Hauser's biological mother, who gave him2
up for adoption, were "truly dedicated" to Hauser's best interests."
For example, it found that a desire to "block the imposition of the death
penalty in an 'attempt to define justice"' motivated two of the plaintiffs." 3 Even defendant encouraged the court to "'see [the] petition for
what it [was], an anti-death penalty crusaders [sic] attempt to overwhelm the courts with volumes of paper work ... and subvert a

competent defendants [sic] right to self-representation.""' 4 The court
also noted that the district court found defendant was competent to
stand trial and represent himself pro se."' It thus held that Hauser's
purported "next friends" had no standing to intervene on his behalf. 116

1236, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that beneficiaries of ERISA plan had no standing
to sue on behalf of the plan for delinquent contributions because legislative history showed
that Congress did not intend ERISA statute to confer standing on beneficiaries).
104. 203 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 1282, 1284.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1285.
108. 223 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2000).

109. Id. at 1317, 1320.
110. Id. at 1323.
111. Id. at 1322 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990)).

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1318. Hauser personally filed a Motion to Vacate Stay of Execution and
argued that plaintiffs had no standing to act on his behalf. Id. at 1317-19.

115. Id.at 1323.
116. Id.
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Ripeness

The ripeness doctrine is often used to prevent a court from reviewing
a law before it is actually enforced. Ripeness is closely linked to
standing because a court may find that a case is not ripe if the plaintiff's
injury is too speculative. The ripeness doctrine "'prevent[s] the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.""' 7
Ripeness arose in several cases before the court in 2000."1s In one,
American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v.
Pinellas County,"9 the court found that plaintiff's challenge of a county
ordinance was ripe because plaintiff had shown "sufficient proof of a
credible threat of prosecution. 1 2 Specifically, plaintiff submitted an
affidavit from an employee who had written a county employee to ask if
plaintiff had to comply with the disputed ordinance. Plaintiff's employee
later talked to the county employee, who not only told her who had to
comply with the ordinance, but also informed her about civil and
criminal penalties for noncompliance.' 2' Noting that plaintiff's inquiry
about compliance was answered by "'someone with knowledge and
authority to speak for the County,"' the court found the threat22 of
prosecution sufficiently credible to make the case ripe for decision.'
In Ward v.County of Orange,'21 on the other hand, the court questioned whether the case was ripe and remanded it.' 24 In Ward plaintiff, an adult entertainment club, claimed that a city ordinance requiring
"adult performance establishments" to apply for a license violated the
First Amendment on its face and as applied.' 2 ' The court, however,
stated that "'without the presentation of a binding conclusive administrative decision, no tangible controversy exists."", 2' The court thus

117.

219 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967),

abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
118. See American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulations, Inc. v. Pinellas
County, 221 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000); Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana
Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1315-16; Ward v. County of Orange, 217 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir.
2000); Gulf Power Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (1th
Cir. 2000).
119. 221 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2000).
120. Id. at 1214.
121. Id. at 1214-15.
122. Id. at 1215 (quoting Digital Properties, Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586,
590 (11th Cir 1997)).
123. 217 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2000).
124. Id. at 1356.
125. Id. at 1352-53.
126. Id. at 1356 (quoting Digital Properties,121 F.3d at 590).
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determined that plaintiff's as-applied claim may not have been ripe if
the county had a procedure that allowed plaintiff to ask members of the
zoning board whether it needed a license.' 27 If this sort of procedure
existed and plaintiff had not followed it, then plaintiff's claim would not
be ripe because no12 s"county official with sufficient authority" had
rendered a decision.

C.

Mootness
The mootness doctrine prevents federal courts from hearing cases that
do not present an actual controversy. A case becomes moot if "the issues
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome." 2 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
invoked the mootness doctrine several times in 2000 because of either a
change in circumstances or a change in applicable law.13 In IAL
Aircraft Holding, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration,3 ' the court
found that a controversy about an airplane's registration in the United
States became moot when the plane's owner, IAL Aircraft Holding, Inc.,
sold it to someone in Brazil. 32 The court had previously issued a
mandate that required the FAA to register the plane.' 3 At the time
the court issued its opinion, however, it was unaware that IAL had sold
the plane.134 The court recalled its mandate because it found that the
case became moot at the moment of sale.'
This change in circum-

127. Id.
128. Id.; see also Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1279 (finding that utility companies'
challenge of FCC formula to determine rent for wires on utility poles not ripe because
plaintiffs could not show that rent formula would result in an unconstitutional taking in
every case).
129. 219 F.3d at 1301 (quoting County of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).
130. See Crawford & Co., 235 F.3d at 1303; Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172; Florida Ass'n of
Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. State of Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.,
225 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2000); Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana
Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1309-10; Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333,
1343 (11th Cir. 2000); IAL Aircraft Holding, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 216 F.3d
1304, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000); Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1318 n.1 (11th Cir.
2000); Lettman v. Reno, 207 F.3d 1368, 1372 (l1th Cir. 2000); Darden v. Ford Consumer
Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2000).
131. 216 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
132. Id. at 1306.
133. Id. at 1305.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1306-07.
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stances divested the court of its jurisdiction
because "IAL no longer
13 6
suffered from a [redressable] injury.

A change in applicable statutes, too, can render a case moot. In
Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 37 the court considered whether a constitutional challenge to a city
ordinance was rendered moot by the city council's enactment of a
superseding statute. Plaintiff, a nonprofit organization, sponsored an
event called the "Pot Festival" in an Atlanta park for several years. The
City of Atlanta asked plaintiff to apply for a permit pursuant to its 1994
Outdoor Festivals ordinance. Plaintiff did so, but the City rejected the
permit because of public safety concerns.'
When plaintiff subsequently challenged the ordinance in the Northern District of Georgia, the
court found parts of it constitutional and parts of it unconstitutional as
a prior restraint.' 9 While the case was on appeal, the city repealed
the ordinance and replaced it with one that purported to address the
district court's constitutional concerns. 40 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals found that a new statute moots a case "only to the extent that
it removes challenged features of the prior law."' 4 ' A case is not moot
if the new law "leaves objectionable features of the prior law substantially undisturbed."'

The court found that, because the new ordinance

did not address plaintiff's constitutional claims, plaintiff's case was not
moot. 143

Finally, the court addressed mootness in a decision that could affect
class action litigation. In Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp.,"1 it
held that class certification can become a moot issue if a court first

136. Id. at 1306; see also Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1173 (finding President Bush's challenge
to Florida recounts not moot even though disputed counties had completed recounts
because of "ever-shifting circumstances" of suits contesting the election); Lettman, 207 F.3d
at 1392 (finding petition for review of administrative order moot after agency vacated
order).
137. 219 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).
138. Id. at 1305.
139. Id. at 1306.
140. Id. at 1309.
141. Id. at 1310 (quoting Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
142. Id. at 1311 (quoting Naturalist Soc'y, Inc., 958 F.2d at 1520).
143. Id. at 1315; see also FloridaAss'n of RehabilitationFacilities,225 F.3d at 1217
(stating that repeal of federal law did not moot plaintiffs claim for violations that occurred
before repeal because Congress explicitly provided that that law would apply to all
violations that occurred before repeal). But see Acker, 210 F.3d at 1318 n.1 (affirming
rejection of party's request for stay where legislation that could have mooted claim was
pending but had not yet been passed).
144. 216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
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considers the merits of the case and grants summary judgment. 45' "It
[is in a] court's discretion," the court stated, "to consider the merits of
146
the claims before their amenability to class certification."
VI.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The Eleventh Circuit Rules require that parties include a statement
of the standard of review for each contention presented in briefs
submitted to the court.1 47 This Article furnishes these standards to
assist practitioners.
In 2000 the court set forth the de novo standard of review in the
following contexts: review of a district court's jurisdiction and its
decision that plaintiffs could not intervene as proper parties;' 4 review
of a district court's decision to grant summary judgment; 149 review of
a district court's decision that a settlement agreement did not violate the
Federal Employers' Liability Act;' 50 review of a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim; 15' review of a district
court's denial of a party's renewed judgment as a matter of law or,
alternatively, for a new trial;' 2 review of a claim of insufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction;'5 review of a tax court's interpretation and application of the Internal Revenue Code; 1 4 review of a
district court's application of admiralty law;155 review of habeas
petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim;' 56 review of a
district court's decision that petition for federal habeas corpus relief was
time-barred;' 5 7 review of a district court's denial of a motion for

145. Id. at 1343.
146. Id.
147. See 11TH CIR. R. 28-1(i)(iii).
148.

Crawford & Co., 235 F.3d at 1298.

149. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000); Succar v. Dade County Sch.
Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000); Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023
(11th Cir. 2000); Wesson v. Huntsman Corp., 206 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 2000);
Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm'n, 200 F.3d 761, 765 (11th Cir. 2000); McCaleb v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 200 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2000).
150. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan, 231 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2000).
151. Grossman v. Nationsbank, 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
152. Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).
153. United States v. Nolan, 223 F.3d 1311, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000).
154. Fabry v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 223 F.3d 1261, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
155. All Underwriters v. Weisberg, 222 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000).
156.

Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 2000).

157. Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); Hepburn v. Moore, 215 F.3d
1208, 1209 (11th Cir. 2000).
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judgment as a matter of law;' review of a district court's denial of
qualified immunity;5 9 review of a district court's order compelling
arbitration;16° review of the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreta-

tion of Immigration and Nationality Act;'6 1 review of a distict court's
application of federal sentencing guidelines; 6 2 review of a district
court's application of statute of limitations; 63 review of a district
court's procedure for choosing alternate jurors."
The court set forth the abuse of discretion standard for the following
issues: review of a district court's rulings on the admission of an expert
witness's testimony;6 5 review of an ERISA plan administrator's
a
decision to deny benefits based on plan interpretations; 6 review of167
district court's grant of an extension of time under Rule 4(a)(5);
review of a district court's award of or refusal to award attorney
fees;" 4 review of a district court's stay of execution;' 69 review of 17a
trial court's denial of a continuance because of attorney illness;
review of a district court's decision to abstain; 7 ' review of a district
court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction;172 review of a
73 review
district court's grant or denial of a motion of civil
7 4 contempt;'
relief.
nobis
coram
of
denial
of a district court's
The court applied a de novo standard to questions of law and a clear
error standard to findings of fact in the following contexts: review of a
district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on selective prosecu-

158. Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 582 (11th Cir. 2000).
159. Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (lth Cir. 2000); Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d
1156, 1164 (11th Cir. 2000).
160. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000).
161. Lettman, 207 F.3d 1368, 1370 (noting that the court will defer to the agency's
interpretation if it is reasonable).
162. United States v. Jamieson, 202 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2000).
163. McCaleb v. A.O. Smith Corp., 200 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2000).
164. United States v. Brewer, 199 F.3d 1283, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2000).
165. Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000).
166. Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 842 (11th Cir. 2000).
167. Cannabis Action Network, Inc. v. City of Gainesville, 231 F.3d 761, 766 (11th Cir.

2000).
168. In re Celotex Corp., 227 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2000); Dillard v. City of
Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000).
169. Hauser v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2000).

170. United States v. Bowe, 221 F. 3d 1183, 1189 (11th Cir. 2000).
171. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2000);
Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000).
172.

United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2000).

173. McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000).
174. Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2000).
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17 6
' review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress;
tion; "75
review of a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss; 77 review of
17
a tax court's findings of fact;
' review of whether a district court's jury
79
law.
the
charge misstated
In addition, the court applied a clearly erroneous standard to review
a district court's resolution of a claim that defendants improperly used
peremptory strikes to challenge African-American jurors;8 0 a plain
error standard to review a district court's conviction of defendant
pursuant to a plea bargain after it failed to inform defendant of his right
not to plead guilty, his right to assistance of counsel, his right to
confront witnesses at trial, and his right against self-incrimination;18 '
an arbitrary and capricious standard to review a decision of the Office
of Personnel Management to deny benefits under the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Act; 82 and a de novo standard for questions of law
and mixed questions of law and fact and clear error to findings of fact
to review of a district court's denial of a habeas petition.' 3

175. United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 806-07 (11th Cir. 2000).
176. United States v. Gordon, 231.F.3d 750, 753-54(11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) (clear error for factual findings; de novo for
legal conclusions); United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000).
177. S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000).
178. Davis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).
179. United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000).
180. Central Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F.3d 629, 635
(11th Cir. 2000).
181. United States v. Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000).
182. Muratore v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 222 F.3d 918, 921
(11th Cir. 2000).
183. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000); Holladay v. Haley, 209
F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000); Means v. Alabama, 209 F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000);
Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1135
(11th Cir. 2000); Alanis-Bustamante v. Reno, 201 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000) (de novo
when dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

